The Third Revolution
Paul Harrison

XVIII. Particular Faults: Sharing the Blame 



Few things in life have a simple cause. If a pedestrian is knocked down in the road, the immediate cause is the impact of a fast-moving lump of heavy metal on a soft human body. But no-one trying to explain the event would stop there. Perhaps the pedestrian was daydreaming. Perhaps the driver was distracted by a pretty woman on the sidewalk. The view may have been obscured by an illegally parked lorry. The chain of causality extends in all directions.

And so it is with environmental damage. Population, technology and consumption impinge directly on the environment. But many other factors affect these three. By incorporating them we can include almost all the elements that critics of Malthusianism consider important.


The filthy rich


For the left, inequality is the fountainhead of all problems.

Inequality is multi-dimensional. It prevails in varying degrees between classes and sexes in every country of every political and economic system. And it exists geographically, between regions of the same country, between countries, and between regions of the world. At every level it has some impact on the environment.

The rich-poor contrast is most heavily emphasized. It has become a cliché of environmental writing that two groups at opposite poles pose the greatest threats to the environment: the richest people on earth, and the poorest.

The rich are certainly a threat. The environmental damage that individuals create increases with wealth. Higher incomes mean higher consumption of resources of all kinds, and therefore higher levels of waste.

Northern countries are far and away the biggest consumers of non-renewable resources. In the late 1980s they were using 58 per cent of the world's fertilizer production, 75 per cent of the oil, 86 per cent of the natural gas, and 93 per cent of nuclear energy. 1

Western countries have been cleaning up their own houses in response to rising public awareness. But they are still sweeping a great deal of filth out of the back door, into the oceans and atmosphere. In the late 1980s, the developed countries generated 91 per cent of the world's industrial waste, 93 per cent of industrial effluents, and 95 per cent of hazardous waste. They were responsible for 87 per cent of the world's chlorofluorocarbon emissions, and 74 per cent of carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuels. 2

Yet they made up only 22 per cent of the world's population in the late 1980s. So, in terms of impact per person, the disparities are even more glaring. The typical person in a developed country uses five times more fertilizer, twelve times more oil, and twenty four times more natural gas than their developing country counterpart. They emit eleven times more carbon dioxide from fossil fuels and twenty six times more chlorofluorocarbons. They produce forty times more industrial waste, fifty two times more industrial effluents, and seventy five times more hazardous waste. 3

Because of these inequalities continued population growth in the North is at present even more of a threat to the global commons than in the South. The average Northerner emits perhaps twenty times more water and climate pollutants than the average southerner. If relative consumption and waste output levels stay the same, the 57.5 million extra northerners expected during the 1990s will pollute the globe more than the extra 915 million Southerners. 4

But we cannot freeze the picture in the present. The balance is changing.

For most resources the growth rates of Northern consumption per person are slowing. Population growth is also slowing. Environmental awareness and commercial pressures are reducing the environmental damage done for each unit of consumption. In developing countries, meanwhile, populations continue to grow rapidly. Consumption per person, starting from a low level, is also growing. And many Third World countries are industrializing rapidly.

Within just a few decades the developing countries will be the biggest polluters in many areas. In 1977, for example, developing countries were using only 27.5 per cent of world fertilizer production. By 1988 their share had risen to 42 per cent. On these trends, developing countries will be the majority consumers of fertilizer by the mid-1990s. By the end of the century they will account for 60 per cent. Their share of carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuels is projected to rise from 26 per cent in 1985 to 44 per cent in 2025. Their share of emissions from deforestation is already 100 per cent, since Northern countries are increasing their net forest area. 5

However, the old dichotomy between `developed' and `developing' countries is increasingly obsolete. Third World countries are found at every stage of income and industrialization: from Guinea, where only 3 per cent of Gross Domestic Product came from manufacturing in 1989, to Brazil, where the share was 35 per cent - higher than Germany or Japan. From Ethiopia, where real income per person, in internationally comparable dollars, was $330 in 1989, to Hong Kong, where it was $15,660 - higher than all but five developed countries. 6

And there is considerable income inequality within countries. The elites of almost all developing countries are consuming and polluting at middle class Western levels. What differs is only the size of the elite.

The rich use more resources, wherever they live. In Mexico City, the residents of high income Chapultepec district use nine times more water per person per day than those of low income Nezahualcoyotl. The rich discard more wastes. In Port Harcourt, Nigeria, the most profligate district throws away five times more municipal wastes per person than the least. 7

The rich contribute far more to global warming. We can estimate roughly how much if we assume that fossil fuel use follows the same pattern as income distribution. Then in the United States, for example, the richest 10 per cent emitted 12.6 tonnes of carbon dixide per person in 1987 - eleven times more than the 1.2 tonnes of the poorest 20 per cent. 8

This exercise produces some remarkable results. Carbon dioxide emissions in the United Kingdom and Japan were only 0.8 tonnes per person among the poorest 20 per cent. This is on a level with the national average for Chad and Iran, and is less than the average Zimbabwean.

By contrast, the wealthiest 10 per cent of Malaysians emit 2.4 tonnes each - on a par with the European average. The wealthiest tenth of Colombians warm the globe as much as the typical Swiss. The richest one in ten Brazilians emit more CO2 than the average Frenchman.

In terms of the global commons, the poor in developed countries probably do little more damage than the average person in developing countries. Rich Southerners, meanwhile, do just as much damage as the average Northerner.


Destitution and degradation


But what about the other half of the cliché? Are the poorest people on earth really among the great environmental destroyers? Are they really more likely to degrade their environments than the great mass of people who are neither rich nor very poor?

In some respects they are. They are more likely to gather free fuels. In deforested areas it is the poorest who exert most pressure on the remaining trees and shrubs. It is the poorest who gather every last dried piece of dung, instead of leaving it to fertilize the soil. Among farmers, it is the poorest families where males are most likely to migrate for work, leaving the wife at home too burdened to take on any extra work to conserve soil. In all these cases, poverty works through the technology element of the three basic factors.

But bigger farmers also degrade the environment, often in bigger ways. They are more likely to use tractors, which can damage sensitive soils. They are more likely to own livestock - and if cattle and goats are not properly managed, they can do more environmental damage than humans.

In Lesotho, the poorest 17 per cent of people posses neither fields nor livestock. Since they have no access to land, they cannot degrade it. The next poorest are the 28 per cent who possess fields but no livestock. They degrade their land by not fertilizing or conserving it. But so do the better off, and they have more land per person. But those who do most damage in Lesotho are the 47 per cent of household who own cattle, and among these the wealthiest 23 per cent of households who own 74 per cent of the cattle. Livestock degrade the highlands in the summer months. In winter they eat stubble and trample down terrace edges. 9

In general, there is little reason to believe that poor smallholders are less likely to conserve their land than owners of larger plots. The reverse may be the case. Yields are usually higher on small farms than on large. Vegetation cover will be thicker, giving better protection against wind and rain. And smallholders are more likely to conserve every inch of land when it is their only resource.

The poor are no more likely than the somewhat better off to start farming in rainforests or marginal areas. Surveys of migrants to cities and to other rural areas show them to be younger and better educated than average. So they are likely to come from families that are not among the poorest. The tendency to move into forest or marginal land is more a generational matter than a rich-poor one. The most likely people to clear new forest, or try their hand in a marginal area, are newly married couples, whose own parents have some land but not enough for an extra household. In humid African countries the better-off are most likely to get hold of large extents of forest land, to clear and farm with hired labour or tractors. 10

The poorest families of all, in most parts of the world, are those of widows, divorcees and single mothers. These are least likely of all to open up new land.

There is some truth in the association of poverty with environmental degradation inside marginal areas. But causation is not one-way here. Even before it is degraded, a marginal area by nature does not produce enough surplus to lift its inhabitants out of poverty. Poor areas and poor people destroy each other.

In cities, the poor live in areas with the worst environmental hazards. But they do not cause the problems: they suffer them. The shanty town as such is not an environmental problem. The problem is air pollution and lack of clean water and sanitation. These are just as often the result of bias in city spending as of poverty.

It is often suggested that the poor have more children. If so they would degrade the environment through the population element of our three leading factors.

Many aspects of poverty do push towards higher fertility: high death rates among children; lack of education; inability to afford family planning; absence of social security in old age.

But within any particular social group, the poorest tend to have fewer children than the somewhat better off. In landowning families, the number of children tends to rise as farms get bigger, because the farmer needs more labour to work the land, and can produce more food to rear more children. 11

Finally, consumption and waste per person is also lowest among the poorest. All in all, the poor probably tread lightest of all upon the earth, and do less damage to the environment than any other group. They are victims, not perpetrators.


Dimensions of inequality


Inequality in the distribution of land has a strong impact on the environment. As we saw in chapter nine, there are many parts of the world where expropriation has driven large numbers of people into marginal or smaller areas. But this factor works its impact on the environment through population, by artificially increasing population density in certain areas.

International inequalities work mainly through technology. Low and unstable commodity prices lower value of land, making conservation less worth while. High levels of debt in the 1980s forced governments in Africa and Latin America to cut imports of fertilizers and reduce their agricultural extension services. Debt slowed the spread of new technologies to increase yields and improve conservation.

Inequality between the sexes also affects technology. In Africa women do an estimated 70 per cent of agricultural work, on top of fuel and water gathering and grinding. They may be short of time for additional work involved in conservation. Even so, women heads of households are the backbone of Kenya's vigorous soil conservation programme.

Sexual inequality promotes higher population growth rates. Birth rates are highest in the regions where women's status is poorest - in Africa, Moslem countries and the northern part of the Indian subcontinent. Here women usually depend on sons for security in divorce or widowhood. Hence there is an incentive to have more sons, and to keep trying for boys if daughters keep arriving. In these regions female enrolment in school is much lower than male. 12


Imperfect markets


The radical right raises a contrasting set of issues relating to freedom of markets and private ownership of property.

Free market price signals have worked reasonably well in regulating our use of mineral resources. If a mineral grows scarce, its cost of production rises. This stimulates recycling, reduced consumption, use of subsitutes and cheaper production methods. The free market mechanism ensures that, as the resource depletes, it is more carefully husbanded.

Improper interference in free market prices often results in environmental damage. State control of crop prices in Africa, where they have been artificially low, led to underproduction. It also led to undervaluation of land, so conservation was less economical. In Europe, crop prices are fixed above world market prices. The result is overproduction, wasteful use of chemical inputs, fertilizer and pesticide pollution, and loss of biodiversity. 13

Command economies, with fixed prices, no competition, and no profit motive, use resources more inefficiently. In 1985, to produce each $1,000 of GNP, China used more than twice as much energy as North America. The USSR and Poland used three times more than Western Europe. 14

Yet the perfectly free market has imperfections of its own.

Free market prices reflect supply and demand, costs and benefits between parties to the transaction. They don't reflect costs and benefits to third parties, other species, or future generations. They don't account for the costs of pollution or resource depletion. Hence they don't help to regulate our relationship to the environment as sink for wastes.

So government interference in market price is justified to ensure that the full environmental costs are reflected in the price of a product. This includes the costs of reducing pollution to acceptable standards, costs borne by sufferers of pollution or depletion, benefits foregone by future users, and so on. When this is done, the market mechanism will begin to help regulate our use of the environment as sink for wastes. 15


The supposed tragedy of the commons


The way in which natural resources are owned and controlled has a strong effect on the level of environmental damage.

Land is best cared for when it is in the freehold of the person who operates it. Then they have an incentive to make sure that it will continue to produce for their lifetime - and that of their children. Small scale private ownership encourages sustainability.

Any weakening of the link between the operator and the land leads to a lower level of care and conservation. That includes not only state ownership and collective farming, but absentee landlordism, sharecropping, and insecure tenancy. Wherever farmers cannot be sure that they or their children will reap the benefits, they will not plant trees or conserve the soil.

Many kinds of resources are not privately owned, but open to all comers, or all members of a community. US environmentalist Garret Hardin has argued that common ownership is the cause of much environmental degradation.

Envisage a pastoralist grazing his livestock on a common rangeland. He wonders whether to add an extra animal to his herd. If he does so, the range will degrade a little faster than otherwise. The individual herdsman will suffer only a small proportion of this loss, since it will be spread across the whole range. Against this he will reap one hundred per cent of the benefit. The only rational decision, then, is to add the extra animal. And another. And another. And every other herdsman reaches the same decision.

This is Hardin's well-known tragedy of the commons: `Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit - in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all.' 16

Hardin applied the theory to all commons used as resources. In the case of forests or fisheries, the decision is whether to cut an extra tree or catch an extra fish, weighed against the risk of depleting the resource base. In such a case the first man to a tree with an axe, the first to the lake with a net, will reap the full benefit immediately. Every one else will lose.

The theory was also extended to waste sinks - what Hardin called `the tragedy of the commons as a cesspool.' It costs someone more to purify waste before releasing it, than they stand to lose from the additional pollution. The `rational' decision is to pollute. Here too, says Hardin, we are locked into a system of fouling our own nests.

It is a bleak and cynical vision: a war of all against all, where each person follows their self interest down the road to social chaos. If it were inescapably valid, the human race would have died out long ago.


The real tragedy of the commons


In practice, things don't usually work out this way. As population density increases, the way in which natural resources are owned or controlled changes, too. Completely open access gives way to common property. Resources are owned collectively by the tribe or village, and regulated to avoid abuse, overuse, or encroachment by outsiders. At even higher population density, private property develops in farm land.

Pasture and forests remain as commons for longer. In some cases they too are privatized. In others they remain community property, or are nationalized as state property. Fluid resources such as big rivers, oceans and atmosphere cannot, by nature, be privatized at all. Other resources - particularly semi-arid pastures - should not be privatized. Their condition fluctuates from year to year, and the survival of herds and herders depends on freedom to move into other areas.

Even where common ownership persists, the tragedy of the commons need not apply. For, as the critics of Hardin's view have pointed out, people cooperate to solve the problems arising on a commons. `Rational men do not pursue collective doom,' British livestock expert Stephen Sandford remarks. `They organize to avoid it.' Hardin forestalled some of the criticism, pointing out that people can exercise `mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon.' They agree to laws against murder and jumping red lights. They can also agree on institutions and regulations to preserve commons. 17

And they do so agree. Most pre-modern societies have arrangements to govern sharing of common resources, and to prevent their degradation. African pastoralists have elaborate kinship arrangements for spreading herds widely across the ranges. In Bali canal water is not simply snatched by the nearest farmer to the headwater. It is distributed equitably by the subak or irrigation committee. For every unit of land he owns a man has the right to a certain measure of water flow. Anyone who takes more is guilty of water-stealing and can be heavily fined. Everyone has to contribute to the upkeep of the canals. 18

The real tragedy of the commons, then, is not the existence of open access or common property in resources. These forms of control are perfectly appropriate in situations of low population density. And for resources that by nature cannot or should not be privatized they are unavoidable.

The tragedy of the commons arises when institutions of ownership or control fail to move in step with the prevailing level of population density. In most of Africa, population density has already reached the level at which private ownership of land would be a normal development. But in most countries land is nationalized. The state has blocked the transition to private ownership of arable land.

In many developing countries, forests, too, have become state property. Local communities have lost power to control the forest, or to benefit from its conservation. Yet the state lacks the will, or the personnel, to take care of it sustainably. And so the forest degrades.

In other cases communal institutions once existed, but were destroyed by colonial powers or modern states. Many Indian villages maintained their commons by unpaid communal labour, and taxed the users of commons. But local taxes and labour obligations were suppressed by government. In Africa pastoral groups controlled access to rangeland by guarding the wells they owned. When governments sank public wells, everyone had free access. The rangeland was opened to all comers, and desertification began around the waterholes. 19

However, some degree of scarcity or degradation must arise before people see the need to control use of the resource. Further depletion will occur in the time taken to develop appropriate institutions. The bigger the commons, the longer this will take. And during the delay, the commons degrade.


The power of democracy


Sooner or later, people perceive environmental degradation as a problem and act on it. The amount of damage done depends on how long it takes to respond - on the delay factors we looked at in the last chapter.

The fastest feedback occurs where the person who suffers from degradation is in a position to control it directly. This is why private ownership of land produces a faster response than common ownership or open access.

In most parts of the world women are first to notice environmental degradation, first to be badly affected. Women clean the dirt of air pollution and nurse the sick children. As forests disappear and wells dry up, women have to walk further and further to get wood and water. Yet they usually lack the power to act on their problems. Men control farmland and common land. Men decide if trees are to be planted or not. Where women are in a position to act - or where men share the burden that make women feel the problems earlier - environmental degradation can be dealt with much sooner. If African men had to gather fuelwood, or if African women were free to plant trees, deforestation and fuelwood shortage in Africa would be remedied much sooner.

Many environmental problems are the result of what economists call `externalities': the effects on third parties with no direct means of controlling the activities that cause the problems. Democracy and the rule of law are the only way in which externalities can be brought into consideration. People must be able to protest, demonstrate, and organize when their interests or health are damaged. That means guaranteeing rights of free speech, assembly and association. The media must be free to report protests - and to investigate pollution incidents, so they must enjoy complete editorial freedom from government and commercial pressures. There must be free access to official information - including the results of official inspections of manufacturing processes. There must be free elections with multiple candidates, so that representatives who don't respond to public pressures can be booted out. There must be an independent legal system with equal access for the poor.

It is no accident that Communist countries were among the most polluted in the world. Where farms and factories are state owned, criticism or protest is suppressed as dissent or rebellion. Independent organizations are seen as a potential focus of resistance, and suppressed.

Even where full democratic rights exist on paper, they may not be effective. Where there is widespread illiteracy, people don't know how to assert their legal rights, to collect evidence, to publicize their case. Ballot rigging is common. And wherever there is corruption, nepotism, or cronyism, protests about pollution will be ignored.

The story of Cubatão, near Sao Paulo's port of Santos in Brazil, illustrates just how important democracy can be. Once a pleasant town by a mangrove-lined valley, cradled among tree-covered mountains, Cubatao developed in the 1960s and 70s into a centre of heavy industry. Steel, fertilizer and chemical factories were built. Poisonous wastes were dumped in the rivers and pumped into the air. Workers built shacks on hillsides and swamplands. 20

By 1985 the mangroves were gone, and the hillside trees were skeletal. Erosion from the unprotected slopes silted up the rivers. Fish died out. There were high levels of tuberculosis, pneumonia, bronchitis, emphysema, stillborn and deformed babies. Cubatao became known as the Valley of Death. Yet under the military regime the press was banned from reporting conditions there.

Right wing dictatorships are no better for the environment than left-wing ones. Everything changed when democracy was restored. In his election campaign, state governor Franco Montoro pledged to reduce pollution. From 1983 on a massive cleanup costing over $300 million was launched. By late 1988 249 out of 320 sources of pollution had been controlled. Smoke had been cut by 92 per cent, sulphur dioxide by 84 per cent, industrial effluents by 91 per cent. Fish returned to the river after a 30-year absence. The hillsides were reseeded with trees.


Towards a holistic analysis


All these direct and indirect causes of environment problems work together. In the real world they weaken or reinforce each other, interact and influence each other.

In Communist and other centrally planned countries, environmental degradation has been particularly bad because of a combination of factors: lack of market freedom, lack of competition between enterprises, and lack of democratic rights. Land degradation is worst in Africa because rapid population growth has coincided with technological stagnation, under one-party and military dictatorships, with state ownership of land and forests, and government control of prices. Deforestation has been so dramatic in the Amazon because of unequal landownership, the absence of democracy for much of the time, resistance to land reform demands, and fiscal favours to rich ranchers.

Our village studies have shown just how complex are even the major causes in individual cases. In Madagascar, deforestation was due to population growth coupled with technical stagnation, which in turn was reinforced by poverty and international debt. In Burkina Faso desertification was the result of population growth and climate change, plus a series of obstacles that together amounted to technological trap. In Abidjan rapid population growth - speeded along by rapid rural population growth - combined with too costly technology and biased city spending to keep many families in squalor. On Hatia Island exposure to disaster was due to population growth on limited land resources, unequal land distribution and river erosion.a

One-sided analysis leads to one sided solutions. Academics and planners must learn to look at all aspects of the situation, and to include population every time. The challenge ahead is so great that we can save the earth's inheritance for future generations only if we understand and deal with all the interlinking causes.


The human-Gaia interaction is a vast system in which all factors interact. There are no "ultimate" causes, though some reach wider or act more directly than others.

Bottom: Population, consumption and technology are the direct determinants of environmental impact. They work together, using resources, emitting wastes and occupying space. When resource demand or waste density exceeds the carrying capacity, depletion, degradation and pollution follow. These create environmental signals.

Right: Scarcities lead, via markets, to change in prices. Consumption and technology change in response. In subsistence economies, the signals directly induce producers to change technology.

Centre right: With externalities such as desertification or human ailments from pollution (left), the signals work through the political system to change taxes and regulations, or to alter the control of commons. The level of democracy and local participation determine the speed of this response.

Top: At major crisis points signals lead to changes in societal values. Politics, women's status, inequality and consumption patterns may be affected.

Centre left: Distribution of income, wealth and land affect levels of poverty and security and therefore mortality and fertility. Poverty drives migration, which increases local population density.

Left: Poverty makes families and governments unable to provide good health and nutrition, and hence raises mortality and fertility. Women's education and other rights affect family welfare, use of family planning etc.

Many other factors are not shown for clarity reasons, eg, the international economic system depresses commodity prices (right), deepening farmers' poverty (centre) and leading to debt which forces government to cut welfare services (left). See Chapters 17 and 18 for full analysis.


1. Fertilizers: FAO Fertilizer Yearbook 1989, Fao Rome, 1990; oil and gas: Hall, D.O. and Scurlock, D.M.O., The Contribution of Biomass to Global Energy Use, c. United Nations Environment Programme, Environmental Data Report, UNEP, Blackwell Reference, Oxford, 1989, p426.

2. Industrial and hazardous wastes: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development The State of the Environment, OECD, Paris, 1991, pp 146; effluents: Meybeck, Michael, et al, Global Freshwater Quality, United Nations Environment Programme, Blackwell Reference, Oxford, 1990, p47; carbon dioxide emissions: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC First Assessment Report, Volume I, August 1990, WGIII p 8; chlorofluorocarbon emissions: World Resources Institute, World Resources 1990-91, World Resources Institute, Washington DC, 1990, p. 346-9.

3. Population share from United Nations Population Division, World Population Prospects 1990, United Nations, New York, 1991.

4. Disparity calculated on the basis of average Northern share of 83.5 per cent, based on examples cited in text. Population increase from United Nations, op. cit.

5. Fertilizer changes from FAO, Fertilizer Yearbook 1989, FAO, Rome, 1990; carbon dioxide projection from Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC First Assessment Report, Volume I, August 1990, WGIII p8.

6. World Bank, World Development Report 1991, World Bank, Washington DC, 1991.

7. Water and waste examples from Environment and Urbanization, 1 (1): 40-50 and 63, 1989.

8. The approach is based on Durning, Alan, Apartheid's Environmental Toll, Worldwatch Paper 95, Worldwatch Institute, Washington DC, 1990, p25. Although direct energy use probably is not so skewed as income, when indirect use - via the additional products and services bought - is included, the assumption is probably a fair one. Data sources: income shares from World Bank, World Development Report 1990, World Bank, Washington DC, 1990, pp236-7; population: United Nations Population Division, World Population Prospects 1990, op. cit.; CO2 emissions: World Resources Institute, World Resources 1990-91, World Resources Institute, Washington DC, 1990, pp346-7. CO2 is given in terms of carbon equivalent. Only emissions from fossil fuels have been included, since emissions from deforestation cannot be assigned on the basis of income groups.

9. Lesotho livestock ownership figures from National Conservation Plan for Lesotho, Ministry of Agriculture, Maseru, 1988, p14.

10. Rudel, Thomas K., Population Growth and Environmental Degradation in Rural Areas of Developing Countries, paper prepared for United Nations Population Division, New York, 1990.

11. World Bank, World Development Report 1984, World Bank, Washington DC, 1984, Box 6.1, page 109.

12. United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 1991, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1991, table 10, p167.

13. On Africa see: World Bank reports: Accelerated Development in sub-Saharan Africa, World Bank, Washington DC, 1981, and Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustianble Growth, World Bank, Washington DC, 1989. On Europe: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Agricultural and Environmental Policies, OECD, Paris, 1989.

14. United Nations Environment Programme, Environmental Data Report 1989/90, p 425.

15. See Pearce, David, et al, Blueprint for a Green Economy, Earthscan, 1989, London.

16. Hardin, Garret, The Tragedy of the Commons, Science, 162: 1243-1248, 1968.

17. Sandford, Stephen, Management of Pastoral Development in the Third World, Wiley, New York, 1983, pp118-127.

18. See Harrison, Paul, The Third World Tomorrow, Penguin Books, London 1983, pp11-15.

19. Jodha, N., Population Growth and Common Property Resources, in Consequences of rapid population growth in developing countries, United Nations Expert Group meeting, 23-26 August 1988, ESA/P/WP.110, United Nations, New York, 1989, pp209-230.

20. Cubatao material based on World Resources Institute, World Resources 1990-91, World Resources Institute, Washington DC, 1990, p41; Satterthwaite, David and Hardoy, Jorge, Squatter Citizen, Earthscan, 1989, pp196-8.

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